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Abstract
The linear and non-flexible nature of deep convolutional
models makes them vulnerable to carefully crafted adver-
sarial perturbations. To tackle this problem, we propose
a non-linear radial basis convolutional feature mapping
by learning a Mahalanobis-like distance function. Our
method then maps the convolutional features onto a linearly
well-separated manifold, which prevents small adversarial
perturbations from forcing a sample to cross the decision
boundary. We test the proposed method on three publicly
available image classification and segmentation datasets
namely, MNIST, ISBI ISIC 2017 skin lesion segmentation,
and NIH Chest X-Ray-14. We evaluate the robustness of our
method to different gradient (targeted and untargeted) and
non-gradient based attacks and compare it to several non-
gradient masking defense strategies. Our results demon-
strate that the proposed method can increase the resilience
of deep convolutional neural networks to adversarial per-
turbations without accuracy drop on clean data.
1. Introduction
Deep convolutional neural networks (CNNs) are highly
vulnerable to adversarial perturbations [14, 43] produced
by two main groups of attack mechanisms: white- and
black-box, in which the target model parameters and ar-
chitecture are accessible and hidden, respectively. In or-
der to mitigate the effect of adversarial attacks, two cate-
gories of defense techniques have been proposed: data-level
and algorithmic-level. Data-level methods include adver-
sarial training [14, 43], pre-/post-processing methods (e.g.,
feature squeezing) [55], pre-processing using basis func-
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tions [39], and noise removal [16, 28]. Algorithmic-level
methods [12, 18, 37] modify the deep model or the train-
ing algorithm by reducing the magnitude of gradients [32]
or blocking/masking gradients [3, 15, 41]. However, these
approaches are not completely effective against several dif-
ferent white- and black-box attacks [28, 37, 47] and pre-
processing based methods might sacrifice accuracy to gain
resilience to attacks that may never happen. Generally, most
of these defense strategies cause a drop in the standard ac-
curacy on clean data [48]. For more details on adversarial
attacks and defenses, we refer the readers to [56].
Gradient masking has shown sub-optimal performance
against different types of adversarial attacks [31, 47]. Atha-
lye et al. [2] identified obfuscated gradients, a special case
of gradient masking that leads to a false sense of security
in defenses against adversarial perturbations. They showed
that 7 out of 9 recent white-box defenses relying on this phe-
nomenon ([3, 8, 15, 25, 37, 41, 53]) are vulnerable to single
step or non-gradient based attacks. They finally suggested
several symptoms of defenses that rely on obfuscated gradi-
ents. Although adversarial training [27] showed reasonable
robustness against first order adversaries, this method has
two major drawbacks. First, in practice the attack strategy
is unknown and it is difficult to choose appropriate adver-
sarial images for training, and second, the method requires
more training time [1]. Furthermore, recent studies [23, 40]
show that the adversarial training overfits the L∞ metric
while remaining highly susceptible to L0, L1, and L2 per-
turbations.
As explored in the literature, successful adversarial at-
tacks are mainly the result of models being too linear [13,
14, 24, 38] in high dimensional manifolds causing the de-
cision boundary to be close to the manifold of the training
data [45] and/or because of the models’ low flexibility [10].
Another hypothesis is that adversarial examples are off the
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data manifold [22, 37, 41]. To boost the non-linearity of a
model, Goodfellow et al. [14] explored a variety of meth-
ods involving utilizing quadratic units and including shal-
low and deep radial basis function (RBF) networks. They
achieved reasonably good performance against adversarial
perturbations with shallow RBF networks. However, they
found it difficult to train deep RBF models, leading to a
high training error using stochastic gradient decent. Fawzi
et al. [11] showed that support vector machines with RBF
kernels can effectively resist adversarial attacks.
Typically, a single RBF network layer takes a vector
of x ∈ Rn as input and outputs a scalar function of the
input vector f(x) : Rn → R computed as f (x) =∑P
i=1 wie
−βiD(x,ci), where P is the number of neurons
in the hidden layer, ci is the center vector for neuron
i, D(x, ci) measures the distance between x and ci, wi
weights the output of neuron i, and βi corresponds to the
width of the Gaussian. The input can be made linearly sep-
arable with a high probability by transforming it to a higher
dimensional space (Cover’s theorem [7])). The Gaussian
basis functions, commonly used in RBF networks, are local
to the center vectors, i.e., lim‖x‖→∞D(x, ci) = 0, which
in turn implies that a small perturbation  added to a sample
input x of the neuron has an increasingly smaller effect on
the output response as x becomes farther from the center of
that neuron. Traditional RBF networks are normally trained
in two sequential steps. First, an unsupervised method, e.g.,
K-means clustering, is applied to find the RBF centers [52]
and, second, a linear model with coefficients wi is fit to the
desired outputs.
To tackle the linearity issue of the current deep CNN
models (i.e., which are persistent despite stacking sev-
eral linear units and using non-linear activation functions
[13, 14, 24, 38]), which results in vulnerability to adversar-
ial perturbations, we equip CNNs with radial basis map-
ping kernels. Radial basis functions with Euclidean dis-
tance might not be effective as the activation of each neuron
depends only on the Euclidean distance between a pattern
and the neuron center. Also, since the activation function is
constrained to be symmetrical, all attributes are considered
equally relevant. To address these limitations, we can add
flexibility to the model by applying asymmetrical quadratic
distance functions, such as the Mahalanobis distance, to the
activation function in order to take into account the variabil-
ity of the attributes and their correlations. However, com-
puting the Mahalanobis distance requires complete knowl-
edge of the attributes, which are not readily available in dy-
namic environments (e.g., features iteratively updated dur-
ing training CNNs), and are not optimized to maximize the
accuracy of the model.
Contributions. In this paper, (I) we propose a new non-
linear kernel based Mahalanobis distance-like feature trans-
formation method. (II) Unlike the traditional Mahalanobis
formulation, in which a constant, pre-defined covariance
matrix is adopted, we propose to learn such a “transforma-
tion” matrix Ψ. (III) We propose to learn the RBF cen-
ters and the Gaussian widths in our RBF transformers. (IV)
Our method adds robustness to attacks without reducing the
model’s performance on clean data, which is not the case
for previously proposed defenses. (V) We propose a defense
mechanism which can be applied to various tasks, e.g., clas-
sification, segmentation (both evaluated in this paper), and
object detection.
2. Method
In this section, we introduce a novel asymmetrical
quadratic distance function (2.1), and then propose a mani-
fold mapping method using the proposed distance function
(2.2). Then we discuss the model optimization and mani-
fold parameter learning algorithm (2.3).
2.1. Adaptive kernelized distance calculation
Given a convolutional feature map f (l) ∈ Fnm of size
n × m × K(l) for layer l of a CNN, the goal is to map
the features onto a new manifold g(l) ∈ Gnm of size
n ×m × P (l) where classes are more likely to be linearly
separable. Towards this end, we leverage an RBF trans-
former that takes feature vectors of f (l)
K(l)
as input and maps
them onto a linearly separable manifold by learning a trans-
formation matrix Ψ(l) ∈ RK(l)×P (l) and a non-linear kernel
κ : F × F → R for which there exists a representation
manifold G and a map φ : F → G such that
κ(x, z) = φ(x).φ(z) ∀x, z ∈ F (1)
The kth RBF neuron activation function is given by
φ
(l)
k = e
−β(l)k D
(
f
(l)
K(l)
,c
(l)
k
)
(2)
where c(l)k is k
th learnable center, and the learnable param-
eter β(l)k controls the width of the k
th Gaussian function.
We use a distance metric D(.) inspired by the Mahalanobis
distance, which refers to a distance between a convolutional
feature vector and a center, and is computed as:
D
(
f
(l)
K(l)
, c
(l)
k
)
=
(
f
(l)
K(l)
− c(l)k
)T (
Ψ(l)
)−1 (
f
(l)
K(l)
− c(l)k
)
(3)
where Ψ(l) refers to the learnable transformation matrix of
size K(l) × P (l). To ensure that the transformation matrix
Ψ(l) is positive semi-definite, we set Ψ(l) = AAT and opti-
mize for A.
Finally, the transformed feature vector g(l)(f (l)
K(l)
) is
computed as:
g(l)
(
f
(l)
K(l)
)
=
P (l)∑
k=1
(
w
(l)
k · φ(l)k
)
+ b(l) (4)
2.2. The proposed manifold mapping
For any intermediate layer l in the network, we compute
the transformed feature vector when using the RBF trans-
formation matrix as
g(l)
(
f (l)
)
=
P (l)∑
k=1
(
w
(l)
k · φ(l)k
)
+ b(l)
=
P (l)∑
k=1
(
wk
(l) · φ(l)k
(
f
(l)
k (θ)
))
+ b(l)
=
P (l)∑
k=1
(
w
(l)
k
)
· exp
{
−β(l)k
(
f
(l)
k (θ)
− c(l)k
)T (
Ψ(l)
)−1 (
f
(l)
k (θ)− c(l)k
)}
+ b(l)
(5)
where f (l) is a function of the CNN parameters Θ.
The detailed diagram of the mapping step is shown in
Figure 1. In each layer l of network, output feature maps of
the convolutional block are concatenated to the transformed
feature maps (Figure 2).
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Figure 1: Detailed diagram of the proposed radial basis
mapping block g(l)(f (l)). In the figure, i = 1 : n;
j = 1 : m; l = 1 : L where n, m, K(l), and P (l) are
the width, the height, and the number of channels of the
input and the output feature maps respectively for layer l.
For the last layer (layer L) of the network, as shown in
the green bounding box in Figure 2, the expression becomes
g(L)
(
f (L)
)
=
P (L)∑
k=1
(
w
(L)
k
)
· exp
{
−β(L)k
(
f
(L)
k (θ)
− c(L)k
)T (
Ψ(L)
)−1 (
f
(L)
k (θ)− c(L)k
)}
+ b(L)
(6)
The concatenation output of the last layer is given by
y =
[
g(L)(f (L)), f (L)
]
(7)
2.3. Model optimization and mapping parameter
learning
All the RBF parameters, i.e., the transformation matrix
Ψ(l), the RBF centers C(l) = {c(l)1 , c(l)2 , · · · , c(l)N(l)} (where
N (l) denotes the number of RBF centers in layer l), and the
widths of the Gaussians β(l)i , along with all the CNN pa-
rameters Θ, are learned end-to-end using back-propagation.
This approach results in the local RBF centers being ad-
justed optimally as they are updated based on the whole
network parameters.
The categorical cross entropy loss is calculated using the
softmax activation applied to the concatenation output of
the last layer. The softmax activation function for the ith
class, denoted by ξ(y)i, is defined as
ξ(y)i =
eyi∑Q
j e
yj
(8)
where Q represents the total number of classes. The loss is
therefore defined by
L = −
Q∑
i
ti log (ξ(y)i) (9)
Since the multi-class classification labels are one-hot en-
coded, the expression for the loss contains only the element
of the target vector t which is not zero, i.e., tp, where p
denotes the positive class. This expression can be simpli-
fied by discarding the summation elements which are zero
because of the target labels, and we get
L = − log
(
eyp∑Q
j e
yj
)
(10)
where yp represents the network output for the positive
class.
Therefore, we define a loss function L encoding the clas-
sification error in the transformed manifold and seek A∗,
β∗, C∗, and Θ∗ that minimize L:
A∗, C∗, β∗,Θ∗ = arg min
A,C,β,Θ
L (A,C, β,Θ) . (11)
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Figure 2: Placing radial basis mapping blocks in a CNN network. ⊗ shows concatenation operation, and f (l) is the output
of convolution layer l. The output of each RBF block contains n ∈ [1, N ] channels that are concatenated to convolutional
feature maps.
3. Data
We conduct two sets of experiments: image (i) classifica-
tion and (ii) segmentation. (i) For the image classification
experiments, we use the MNIST [21] and the NIH Chest
X-Ray-14 [51] (hereafter referred to as CHEST) datasets,
where the latter comprises of 112,120 gray-scale images
with 14 disease labels and one ‘no (clinical) finding’ label.
We treat all the disease classes as positive and formulate a
binary classification task. We randomly selected 90,000 im-
ages for training: 45,000 images with “positive” label and
the remaining 45,000 with “negative” label. The validation
set comprised of 13,332 images with 6,666 images of each
label. We randomly picked 200 unseen images as the test
set, with 93 images of positive and 107 images of nega-
tive class, respectively. These clean (test) images are used
for carrying out different adversarial attacks and the models
trained on clean images are evaluated against them. (ii) For
the image segmentation task experiments, we use the 2D
RGB skin lesion dataset from the 2017 IEEE ISBI Inter-
national Skin Imaging Collaboration (ISIC) Challenge [6]
(hereafter referred to as SKIN). We trained on a set of 2,000
images and test on an unseen set of 150 images.
4. Experiments and results
In this section, we report the results of several experi-
ments for two tasks of classification and segmentation. We
first start with MNIST as it has extensively been used for
evaluating adversarial attacks and defenses. Next, we show
how the proposed method is applicable to another classifi-
cation dataset and segmentation task.
4.1. Evaluation on classification task
In this section, we analyze the performance of the
proposed method on two different classifications datasets
MNIST and CHEST. In Table 1, we report the results of the
proposed method on MNIST dataset when attacked by dif-
ferent targeted and un-targeted attacks i.e., fast gradient sign
method (FGSM) [19], basic iterative method (BIM) [19],
projected gradient descent (PGD) [27], Carlini & Wag-
ner method (C&W) [5], and momentum iterative method
(MIM) [9] (the winner of NIPS 2017 adversarial attacks
competition). The proposed method (i.e., PROP) success-
fully resists all the attacks (with both L∞ and L2 per-
turbations) for which the 3-layers CNN (i.e., ORIG) net-
work almost completely fails e.g., for the strongest attack
(i.e., MIM) the proposed method achieves 64.25% accu-
racy while the original CNN network obtains almost zero
(0.58%) accuracy. Further, we test the proposed method
with two non-gradient based attacks: simultaneous per-
turbation stochastic approximation (SPSA) [49] and Gaus-
sian additive noise (GN) [33] to show that the robustness
of the proposed method is not because of gradient mask-
ing. We compare our results to other defenses e.g., Binary
CNN, Nearest Neighbour (NN) model, Analysis by Synthe-
sis (ABS), Binary ABS [23] and Fortified Networks [20].
Looking at the Binary ABS and ABS results in Table 1,
the former generally outperforms the latter, but it should be
noted that Binary ABS is applicable only to simple datasets,
e.g., MNIST, as it leverages binarization. Although Forti-
fied Net outperforms our method for the FGSM attack, it
has been tested only on gradient-based attacks, and there-
fore, it is unclear how it would perform against gradient-
free attacks such as SPSA and GN.
To ensure that the robustness of the proposed method is
not due to masked/obfuscated gradient, as suggested by [2],
we test the proposed feature mapping method based on sev-
eral characteristic behaviors of defenses that cause obfus-
cated gradients to occur. a) As reported in Table 1, one-
step attacks (e.g., FGSM) did not perform better than iter-
ative attacks (e.g., BIM, MIM); b) According to Tables 4
and 5, black-box attacks did not perform better than white-
box ones; c) as shown in Figure 3 (a and b), larger distor-
tion factors monotonically increase the attack success rate;
d) the proposed method performs well against gradient-free
attacks e.g., GN and SPSA. The subplot (b) in Figure 3 also
indicates that the robustness of the proposed method is not
because of numerical instability of gradients.
Next, to quantify the compactness and separability of
different clusters/classes, we evaluate the features produced
ORIG and PROP methods with clustering evaluation tech-
niques such as mutual information based score [50], homo-
Table 1: Classification accuracy under different attacks tested on MNIST dataset. FGSM:  = 0.3; BIM:  = 0.3 and
iterations = 5; MIM:  = 0.3, iterations = 10, and decay factor = 1; PGD:  = 0.1, iterations = 40; C&W: iterations = 50,
GN:  = 20; SPSA:  = 0.3. “n/a” denotes that the corresponding entry was not reported in the respective paper.
Models Clean L2 L∞
C&W [5] GN [33] FGSM [19] BIM [19] MIM [9] PGD [27] SPSA [49]
ORIG [30] 0.9930 0.1808 0.7227 0.0968 0.0070 0.0051 0.1365 0.3200
Binary CNN [23] 0.9850 n/a 0.9200 0.7100 0.7000 0.7000 n/a n/a
NN [23] 0.9690 n/a 0.9100 0.6800 0.4300 0.2600 n/a n/a
Binary ABS [23] 0.9900 n/a 0.8900 0.8500 0.8600 0.8500 n/a n/a
ABS [23] 0.9900 n/a 0.9800 0.3400 0.1300 0.1700 n/a n/a
Fortified Net [20] 0.9893 0.6058 n/a 0.9131 n/a n/a 0.7954 n/a
PROP 0.9942 0.9879 0.7506 0.8582 0.7887 0.6425 0.8157 0.7092
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Figure 3: Gradient masking analysis: (a) accuracy-
distortion plots and (b) gradient distribution for the pro-
posed method and the original CNN
geneity and completeness [35], Silhouette coefficient [36],
and Calinski-Harabaz index [4]. Both Silhouette coefficient
and Calinski-Harabaz index quantify how well clusters are
separated from each other and how compact they are with-
out taking into account the ground truth labels, while mu-
tual information based score, homogeneity, and complete-
ness scores evaluate clusters based on labels. As reported in
Table 2, when the original CNN network applies radial basis
feature mapping it achieves considerably higher scores (for
all the metrics, higher values are better). As both the orig-
inal and the proposed method achieved high classification
test accuracy i.e., ∼ 99%, the difference in scores for label
based metrics, i.e., mutual information based, homogeneity,
and completeness, scores are small.
Table 2: Feature mapping analysis via intra-class compact-
ness and inter-class separability measures of the MNIST
dataset for original 3-layer CNN versus the proposed
method. The abbreviated column headers are Silhouette,
Calinski, Mutual Information, Homogeneity, and Com-
pleteness metrics, respectively.
Sil. Cal. MI Homo. Comp.
ORIG [30] 0.2612 1658.20 0.9695 0.9696 0.9721
PROP 0.4284 2570.42 0.9720 0.9721 0.9815
In Figure 4, we visualize the feature spaces of each layer
in a simple 3-layer CNN using t-SNE [26] and PCA [17]
methods by reducing the high dimensional feature space
into two dimensions. As can be seen, the proposed ra-
dial basis feature mapping reduces intra-class and increases
inter-class distances.
To test the robustness of the proposed method on
CHEST, we follow the strategy of Taghanaki et al. [44].
We select Inception-ResNet-v2 [42] and modify it by the
proposed radial basis function blocks. According to the
study done by Taghanaki et al. [44], we focus on the
most effective attacks in term of imperceptibility and power
i.e., gradient-based attacks (basic iterative method [19]:
BIM and L1-BIM). We also compare the proposed method
with two defense strategies: Gaussian data augmentation
t-SNE 1st layer                         t-SNE 2nd layer                               t-SNE 3rd layer                           PCA 3rd layer
Orig.
Prop.
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
Figure 4: Feature space visualization at different layers via t-SNE and PCA of MNIST dataset produced via original 3-layer
CNN network and the proposed method.
(GDA) [57] and feature squeezing (FSM) [55]. GDA is a
data augmentation technique that augments a dataset with
copies of the original samples to which Gaussian noise has
been added. FSM method reduces the precision of the
components of the original input by encoding them with a
smaller number of bits. In Table 3, we report the classifi-
cation accuracy of different attacks and defenses (including
PROP) on CHEST.
Table 3: Classification accuracy on CHEST for different
attacks and defenses.
Defense
Attack Iteration ORIG GDA FSM PROP
L1 BIM [19] 5 0 0 0.55 0.63
L∞ BIM [19] 5 0 0 0.54 0.65
Clean - 0.74 0.75 0.57 0.74
4.2. Evaluation on segmentation task
To assess the segmentation vulnerability to adversarial
attacks, we apply the dense adversary generation (DAG)
method proposed by Xie et al. [54] to two state-of-the-art
segmentation networks: U-Net [34] and V-Net [29] under
both white- and black-box conditions. We compare the pro-
posed feature mapping method to other defense strategies
e.g., Gaussian and median feature squeezing [55] (FSG and
FSM, respectively) and adversarial training [14] (ADVT)
on SKIN. From Table 4, it can be seen that the proposed
method is more robust to adversarial attacks and when ap-
plied to U-Net, its performance deteriorates much lesser
than the next best method (ADVT) 1.60% and 6.39% vs
9.44% and 13.47% after 10 and 30 iterations of the at-
tack with γ = 0.03. Similar performance was also ob-
served for V-Net, where the accuracy drop of the proposed
method using the same γ for 10 iterations was 8.50%,
while the next best method (ADVT) dropped by 11.76%.
It should also be noted that applying the feature mapping
led to an improvement in the segmentation accuracy on
clean (non-attacked/unperturbed) images, and the perfor-
mance increased to 0.7780 from the original 0.7743 for U-
Net, and to 0.8213 from the original 0.8070 for V-Net.
Figure 5 visualizes the segmentation results of a few
samples from SKIN for different defense strategies. As
shown, the proposed method obtains the closest results to
the ISIC ground truth (GT) than all other methods. Al-
though adversarial training (ADVT) also produces promis-
ing segmentation results, it requires knowledge of the adver-
sary in order to perform robust optimization which is almost
impossible to obtain in practice since the attack is unknown.
However, the proposed method does not have such a depen-
dency.
As reported in Table 5, under black-box attack, the pro-
posed method is the best performing method across all 12
experiments except for one in which the accuracy of the
best method was just 0.0022 higher (i.e., 0.7284 ± 0.2682
vs 0.7262 ± 0.2621). However, it should be noted that the
standard deviation of the winner is larger than the proposed
method.
Next, we analyze the usefulness of learning the trans-
formation matrix (Ψ) and width of the Gaussian (β) in our
Mahalanobis-like distance calculation. As can be seen in
Table 6, in all the cases, i.e., testing with clean images and
images 10 and 30 iterations of attack, our method with Ψ
and β achieved higher performance.
Table 4: Segmentation results (average DICE ± standard error) of different defense mechanisms compared to the proposed
radial basis feature mapping method for V-Net and U-Net under DAG attack. 10i and 30i refer to 10 and 30 iterations of
attack, respectively.
Network Method Clean 10i (% Accuracy drop) 30i (% Accuracy drop)
U-Net [34]
ORIG [34] 0.7743± 0.0202 0.5594± 0.0196(27.75%) 0.4396± 0.0222(43.23%)
FSG [55] 0.7292± 0.0229 0.6382± 0.0206(15.58%) 0.5858± 0.0218(24.34%)
FSM [55] 0.7695± 0.0198 0.6039± 0.0199(22.01%) 0.5396± 0.0211(30.31%)
ADVT [14] 0.6703± 0.0273 0.7012± 0.0255(9.44%) 0.6700± 0.0260(13.47%)
PROP 0.7780 ± 0.0209 0.7619 ± 0.0208 (1.60%) 0.7248 ± 0.0226 (6.39%)
V-Net [29]
ORIG [34] 0.8070± 0.0189 0.5320± 0.0207(34.10%) 0.3865± 0.0217(52.10%)
FSG [55] 0.7886± 0.0205 0.6990± 0.0189(13.38%) 0.6840± 0.0188(15.24%)
FSM [55] 0.8084± 0.0189 0.5928± 0.0209(26.54%) 0.5144± 0.0218(36.26%)
ADVT [14] 0.7924± 0.0162 0.7121± 0.0174(11.76%) 0.7113 ± 0.0179 (11.85%)
PROP 0.8213 ± 0.0177 0.7384 ± 0.0169 (8.50%) 0.6944± 0.0178(13.95%)
Table 5: Segmentation DICE ± standard error scores of black-box attacks; adversarial images were produced with methods
in first left column and tested with methods in the first row. U-PROP and V-PROP refer to equipped U-Net and V-Net with
our mapping method.
- U-Net [34] U-PROP V-Net [29] V-PROP
U-Net [34] - 0.7341 ± 0.0205 0.6364± 0.0189 0.7210± 0.0189
U-PROP 0.7284 ± 0.0219 - 0.6590± 0.0218 0.7262± 0.0241
V-Net [29] 0.7649± 0.0168 0.7773 ± 0.0167 - 0.7478± 0.2090
V-PROP 0.7922± 0.0188 0.7964 ± 0.0192 0.6948± 0.0171 -
Figure 5: Lesion segmentation sample results on SKIN for different defense strategies applied with U-Net.
Figure 6 shows how the Ψ of a single layer converges
after a few epochs on the MNIST dataset. The Y-axis is the
Frobenius norm of the change in Ψ between two consecu-
tive epochs. Adopting the value Ψ converges to results in a
Table 6: Ablation study over the usefulness of learning the transformation matrix Ψ and β on SKIN for V-Net; mean ±
standard error
Ψ β Dice FPR FNR
Clean
7 3 0.7721± 0.0210 0.0149± 0.0022 0.2041± 0.0245
3 7 0.8200± 0.0163 0.0177± 0.0026 0.1547± 0.0188
7 7 0.8002± 0.0184 0.0137± 0.0022 0.1883± 0.0211
3 3 0.8213 ± 0.0177 0.0141± 0.0020 0.1706± 0.0200
10i
7 3 0.6471± 0.0213 0.0437± 0.0052 0.1992± 0.0261
3 7 0.7010± 0.0161 0.0606± 0.0054 0.1020± 0.0166
7 7 0.6740± 0.0187 0.0458± 0.0037 0.1472± 0.0217
3 3 0.7384 ± 0.0169 0.0444± 0.0041 0.1234± 0.0186
30i
7 3 0.6010± 0.0221 0.0371± 0.0030 0.2304± 0.0273
3 7 0.6458± 0.0180 0.0633± 0.0042 0.1164± 0.0183
7 7 0.6188± 0.0188 0.0615± 0.0040 0.1384± 0.0205
3 3 0.6944 ± 0.0179 0.0418± 0.0038 0.1489± 0.0205
superior performance (e.g., mean Dice 0.8213 vs 0.7721, as
reported in Table 6) compared to when we do not optimize
for Ψ, i.e., hold it constant (identity matrix).
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Figure 6: Convergence: Plotting the Frobenius norm of the
change in Ψ between two consecutive epochs.
5. Implementation details
5.1. Classification experiments
• MNIST experiments: For both the original CNN with
3-layers (i.e., ORIG) and the proposed method (i.e., PROP),
we used a batch size of 128 and Adam optimizer with learn-
ing rate of 0.001.
• CHEST: Inception-ResNet-v2 network was trained
with a batch size of 4 with RMSProp optimizer [46] with
a decay of 0.9 and  = 1 and an initial learning rate of
0.045, decayed every 2 epochs using an exponential rate of
0.94.
For all the gradient based attacks applied in the classifi-
cation part, we used the CleverHans library [30], and for the
Gaussian additive noise attack, we used FoolBox [33].
5.2. Segmentation experiments
For both U-Net and V-Net, we used a batch size of 16,
ADADELTA optimizer with learning rate of 1.0, rho = 0.95,
and decay = 0.0. We tested the DAG method with 10 and
30 iterations and perturbation factor γ = 0.03. For FSM
and FSG defenses, we applied a window size of 3× 3 and a
standard deviation of 1.0, respectively.
6. Conclusion
We proposed a nonlinear radial basis feature mapping
method to transform layer-wise convolutional features into
a new manifold, where improved class separation reduces
the effectiveness of perturbations when attempting to fool
the model. We evaluated the model under white- and black-
box attacks for two different tasks of image classification
and segmentation and compared our method to other non-
gradient based defenses. We also performed several tests to
ensure that the robustness of the proposed method is neither
because of numerical instability of gradients nor because
of gradient masking. In contrast to previous methods, our
proposed feature mapping improved the classification and
segmentation accuracy on both clean and perturbed images.
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